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PRIVATE PARTIES AS DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL 
RIGHTS LITIGATION 
Myriam Gilles* 
Civil rights litigation tends to follow the familiar pattern of an 
individual or class of individuals bringing suit against a governmental 
entity or official seeking monetary or injunctive relief for violations of 
their constitutional rights as protected under a state or federal statute.  
The plaintiffs in these cases are from every walk of life and represent 
every group and sub-group of American society.  The defendants, 
however, share one important characteristic: when engaged in the 
complained-of activity, they must be acting “under color of state law.” 
What does it mean to act “under color of state law”?  At the 
simplest level, governments and their officials act under color of state 
law when engaged in injurious activity that is either authorized by the 
state or “cloaked in the authority of the state.”1  This understanding of 
state action as exclusively relating to governmental activity squares with 
our generally held view that the Constitution’s prohibitions run only 
against the government.2  This view is, however, becoming increasingly 
outdated as more and more governmental functions are privatized, 
contracted-out, outsourced, or transferred from the public to the private 
sector. 
Champions of privatization argue that private firms are more 
efficient than government because of economies of scale, higher labor 
 
 *  Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  I would like to thank all the authors for 
participating in this symposium and members of the Civil Rights Section for attending the panel 
discussion last January; the Association of American Law Schools for its support of the Section; 
and the students of the Cardozo Law Review for their hard work. 
 1 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 2 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (“[C]ivil rights, such as are guarantied by the 
constitution against state aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, 
unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive 
proceedings.”). 
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productivity, and fewer legal constraints.3  As these arguments gain 
favor and force, nearly every aspect of governmental services becomes 
a potential candidate for privatization.4  Privatization is occurring in the 
administration of child welfare services, corrections facilities, 
education, emergency medical services, environmental protection, fire 
fighting, juvenile rehabilitation, local libraries, parking enforcement, 
parks and recreations, road maintenance, transportation, water 
treatment, waste and recycling services, and welfare administration.5  
As one commentator aptly notes, “privatization is now virtually a 
national obsession.”6 
But even as supporters of privatization argue about market-based 
efficiencies and choice-creation models, skeptics raise important 
concerns about the potential effects of privatization on the legal system.  
Process-based questions of how the legal system should address claims 
brought by the victims of privatization’s inevitable problems of abuse, 
fraud, and negligence lead naturally to substantive questions about the 
legal status of private entities in these cases, the standards by which 
these private firms will be adjudged, and the damages they will be 
forced to factor into their cost-based analyses. 
To be sure, some of these questions are not necessarily new: it has 
been long-established that, in certain circumstances, private actors may 
be said to have acted “under color of state law” and held liable for civil 
rights violations.7 For example, a private prison management 
corporation hired to run a state’s prison system is a state actor for 
purposes of the inevitable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging Fourth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations brought by an inmate 
against a private guard (who is also a state actor for these purposes).8  
 
 3 Critics of privatization are less idealistic: they argue that the nature of government services 
makes many of them inappropriate for privatization, and that contracting may entail hidden 
information costs, require increased monitoring, and may even start a race to the bottom in the 
form of “low-ball” bidding.  See, e.g., ELLIOT SCLAR, YOU DON’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU 
PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION (2000); PAUL STARR, THE LIMITS OF 
PRIVATIZATION (Economic Policy Institute, 1987). 
 4 “Recent privatization efforts, particularly in health care and welfare programs, public 
education, and prisons, reveal a trend of greater discretion and broader responsibilities being 
delegated to private hands.”  Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1367, 1369 (2003). 
 5 More information about privatization efforts in each of these categories at the local, state, 
and federal level is available at http://www.privatization.org/database/policyissues.html. 
 6 Metzger, supra note 4, at 1369. 
 7 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (finding that private 
defendants invoking a state-created attachment statute act “under color of state law” within the 
meaning of § 1983 if their actions are “fairly attributable to the State”); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) (“[A] State is responsible for the discriminatory act of a private 
party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.”). 
 8 In recent years, private prisons have been the most visible reflections of the potential 
downfalls of privatization.  The private prison industry’s sales pitch sounds good—it saves tax 
dollars and shields government from lawsuits—but the reality may not live up to the promise.  
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And some pieces of federal civil rights legislation do not require state 
action and therefore have been applied, without pause, to private 
parties.9 
But other legal questions raised by the tidal wave of privatization 
are completely novel, as courts are only beginning to address these 
issues in a systematic way.  For this reason, the articles in this timely 
symposium issue serve as an important resource for those considering 
the framework of public claims brought against private actors and the 
substantive reach and impact of those claims on outsourcing policies. 
One of the first questions that arises in this context is whether the 
private entity is subject to suit under the applicable civil rights statute.  
In short, in what circumstances can it be said that a private defendant 
has acted “under color of law”?  Michael Wells’s provocative paper, 
Identifying State Actors in Constitutional Litigation: Reviving the Role 
of Substantive Context, uses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Association10 to address this question and to highlight the problems with 
current “state action” jurisprudence. 
The Justices in Brentwood, as in most modern state action cases, 
engaged in a search for any and all indicia of state participation, 
involvement, coercion, control, delegation, entwinement or 
encouragement of the private activity that led to the constitutional 
violation.  According to Professor Wells, this search is unnecessary and 
results in an understanding of “state action” as a stand-alone doctrine—
a barrier to litigation—without regard to the substantive constitutional 
issues raised by the individual case.  Wells argues that this leaves us 
with a morass of conflicting case law—in each subsequent case, the 
state action line becomes more difficult to draw and the distinctions 
more difficult to articulate. 
Instead of searching for state action with a checklist and a 
clipboard, Professor Wells urges greater focus on the substantive 
constitutional issues raised in each individual case.  For example, in a 
First Amendment case involving a private association made up of public 
and private members, rather than ask whether the membership was so 
“entwined” as to evidence state action, Professor Wells would ask a 
court to consider whether the substantive First Amendment claim 
should be subject to a stronger or a weaker constraint in the particular 
case.  A focus on the substantive context, he forcefully argues, would 
result in a more fertile jurisprudence based mainly on the merits of 
constitutional claims, rather than the niceties of state action doctrine.11  
 
See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997). 
 9 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982, 1985(3) (2000). 
 10 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
 11  Michael Wells, Identifying State Actors in Constitutional Litigation: Reviving the Role of 
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In many ways, Professor Wells’s recommendation is reminiscent of 
another movement in section 1983 jurisprudence: in the 1960s and 
1970s, the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence became 
mired in a complex and indeterminate analysis of a state actor’s intent, 
good faith, and knowledge of the law.  By the late 1990s, however, the 
Court had changed its focus in qualified immunity analysis away from 
subjective intent to a Wellsian concentration on substantive 
constitutional doctrine;12 this development helped clarify the doctrine of 
qualified immunity—which, like the state action requirement, serves as 
a constraint on litigation—as well as to revivify constitutional tort 
litigation by adding substance to its procedural bones. 
Once we have determined that a private actor is indeed acting 
“under color of” state law, and is therefore a proper defendant under 
civil rights statutes, what framework should we use to determine 
whether that private actor ought to be held liable?  In particular, do the 
rules of municipal liability jurisprudence apply to private entities and 
their employees?  Barbara Kritchevsky tackles this broad and far-
reaching question in her article, Civil Rights Liability of Private 
Entities. 
Professor Kritchevsky notes that while the Supreme Court has 
decided cases in which the traditional rules governing section 1983 
liability apply seamlessly to suits against private individuals—namely, 
cases in which private individuals seek the qualified immunity often 
accorded governmental actors13—the Court has not yet dealt with a host 
of more difficult questions that arise when trying to apply its municipal 
liability jurisprudence to private employers.  What standards ought to 
should apply where a plaintiff sues both the private individual/employee 
and the private employer?  Should such a case be decided on Monell 
grounds, or do policy, economics and history dictate a different 
outcome?  What, if any, immunities may private entities claim in civil 
rights cases?  Should punitive damages be available?  In what 
circumstances may a private entity claim state sovereign immunity 
under the Eleventh Amendment? 
Professor Kritchevsky helpfully analyzes the lower federal court 
decisions on the liability of private defendants under section 1983.  She 
concludes that the current jurisprudence is flawed because courts 
“generally analogize private and government entities for purposes of 
determining the scope of entity liability, but compare private entities 
and private individuals for immunity analysis.”14  This approach leads 
 
Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 (2004). 
 12 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). 
 13 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. 158; Richardson, 521 U.S. 399. 
 14 Barbara Kritchevsky, Civil Rights Liability of Private Entities, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 35, 39 
(2004). 
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to unfair and conflicting results, as municipal liability jurisprudence 
does not answer all the questions that arise in cases involving private 
entities.  Professor Kritchevsky suggests that rather than attempt to 
import all of section 1983 jurisprudence into the increasing number of 
cases involving private entities, courts should instead focus on private 
corporations’ historic liability and the policies underlying civil rights 
legislation. 
Once we have decided that a private entity is an appropriate 
defendant and figured out the standards and rules that should govern a 
determination of liability, we must ask a final question: what defenses 
are available to these parties?  Enter Professor Sheldon Nahmod, whose 
article, The Emerging Section 1983 Private Party Defense, focuses on 
the availability and scope of the good faith defense to private 
individuals who are named as defendants in civil rights litigation.  In 
particular, Professor Nahmod is interested in whether the good faith 
defense for private actors is akin to the qualified immunity accorded 
governmental actors.  Tracing the Supreme Court’s analysis from Lugar 
v. Edmondson Oil, Wyatt v. Cole, and Richardson v. McKnight, 
Professor Nahmod persuasively argues that the rationale for extending a 
good faith defense to private actors in civil rights suits was first based 
on the common law background of malicious prosecution and abuse of 
process.  From these roots, that rationale transmogrified into a 
“normative judicial intuition . . . that damages liability be based on 
fault.”15  This intuition, Professor Nahmod suggests, “implicates a 
private person’s duty to know constitutional law in appropriate 
circumstances,” and as such, differs significantly from the 
“instrumental, policy concerns” that serve as the basis for qualified 
immunity.16 
Principles of fault, Professor Nahmod concludes, are therefore very 
much at play in private party civil rights litigation and the good faith 
defense is appropriate because it makes private parties engage in “harm-
causing unconstitutional” behavior liable for damages “only when they 
act with fault, that is, without an honest and reasonable belief in the 
constitutionality of their conduct.”17 
Finally, Professor Jack Beermann has written a detailed 
exploration of the underlying motivations of plaintiffs who bring section 
1983 cases against private parties.  Rather than engage in an extended 
survey of practitioners, Professor Beermann examines the incentives 
these plaintiffs have to bring their claims under both section 1983 and 
state law.  He then compares these incentives with each other and with 
 
 15 Sheldon Nahmod, The Emerging Section 1983 Private Party Defense, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 81, 88 (2004). 
 16  Id. at 89. 
 17 Id. at 94. 
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those for bringing a traditional section 1983 action against a public 
entity.  Despite the “long odds” faced by plaintiffs bringing private 
section 1983 cases, Professor Beermann suspects that these plaintiffs 
might be partially motivated by the “symbolic” value of the litigation, 
“in which public interest oriented litigants or lawyers use the legal 
system to pursue normative goals.”18  These plaintiffs, consciously or 
not, may be making the point that “[w]hat is important are the 
constitutional values at stake, not the identity of the party threatening 
them.”19 
These articles are important contributions to the ongoing debate 
over the wisdom of privatization as a panacea for all social ills.  As this 
symposium goes to press, that debate has moved beyond the domestic 
sphere and into the international with the graphic news of abuses of 
Iraqi prisoners by American troops and private security personnel at 
Abu Ghraib prison.20  Private contractors have previously been used in 
wartime, but never to the extent as they are currently deployed in Iraq.21  
As allegations about the involvement of private contractors22 continue 
to surface it seems evident that, even abroad, we spread privatization 
more easily than democracy.  While American courts struggle to resolve 
domestic issues surrounding the liability of private defendants under 
civil rights laws, questions concerning the potential liability of private 
contractors, their employers, and the United States government itself are 
 
 18 Jack Beermann, Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties Under Section 1983?, 26 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 9, 34 (2004). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Of the thirty seven interrogators at Abu Ghraib prison, twenty seven were employed by a 
Virginia private contractor called CACI International. 
 21 Outsourcing of services to the armed forces has been on the rise since the end of the Cold 
War and the concomitant downsizing of the world’s huge standing armies. In 1991, the U.S. 
military numbered 2 million; today, it’s 1.5 million. Thousands of newly unemployed special 
forces and intelligence officers signed up with the burgeoning private security industry.  The 
difference is that a decade ago, the industry was mainly used by multinational corporations and 
oil companies operating in high-risk regions.  Today, after 9/11 and the war on terror, its biggest 
client is the Pentagon.  There are hundreds of for-profit companies, mainly American, some 
British, with about 20,000 personnel in Iraq, doing traditional military work, including 
intelligence. That makes private contractors the largest contingent after the U.S. military, far 
outnumbering the British forces.  Many analysts believe that it was the under-deployment of 
troops (only 130,000 were sent, whereas the military recommended deploying over 250,000) that 
led to the unprecedented number of private contractors being used in Iraq.  See, e.g., Spencer E. 
Ante, The Other Army, BUS. WK., May 31, 2004, at 76. 
 22 Private contractors (also called private military firms, or PMFs) have been active in Iraq 
since the start of the war, and their presence has only increased with the beginning of the 
reconstruction.  These firms—the largest of which is Kellogg, Brown and Root, a subsidiary of 
Halliburton, formerly headed by Vice-President Dick Cheney—are used for feeding the troops, 
guarding key sites, managing logistics, training military and police forces and providing security; 
in short, everything short of front-line combat.  And apparently, independent contractors were 
also used to “interrogate” prisoners at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq.  See generally P.W. 
SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 6, 8 
(2003). 
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quickly becoming even more pressing on the international front. 
How has the legal system addressed these questions?  Will it 
address them?  Local prosecution is not a likely option.  Iraq lacks a 
functioning judiciary,23 and even if one rises from the rubble, private 
contractors are immune from criminal liability.24  Domestic criminal 
liability is equally unlikely.  While seven reservist guards currently face 
criminal trials and/or court marshal,25 the private contractors allegedly 
involved are not subject to military law and the Justice Department 
seems unlikely to prosecute them.26  Civil rights claims by victims of 
the abuse, were such claims ever to be filed, would also likely fail under 
the “government contractor” defense which shields government 
contractors from liability when they provide services in accordance with 
government specifications.  Given Major General Antonio Taguba’s 
report on the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and his finding that military 
intelligence officials worked with private contractors in perpetuating 
these abuses, that defense would be quite strong.  Other statutory 
claims—under the War Crimes Act of 196627 or the Military 
Extrajurisdictional Act28—also face significant obstacles. 
 
 23 Though local prosecutions seem unlikely from this vantage point, the recent trial and 
conviction of three Americans accused of torturing Afghans in a private jail in a Kabul court 
serves as a cautionary tale for making quick predictions.  See Stephen Graham, Americans 
Sentenced in Afghan Torture, (Sept. 16, 2004), available at http://story.news.yahoo.com/ 
news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20040915/ap_on_re_as/afghan_us_vigilantes. 
  The defense unsuccessfully argued that the trial failed to meet basic international standards 
of fairness, and pointed to the unfair sentences: the three-judge panel sentenced two Americans 
alleged to have participated in the torture to ten years, a journalist who filmed the incident to 
eight years and four Afghan accomplices to one year terms.  Id. 
 24 Licensed contractors with the U.S. government sign agreements that provide them with 
immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law.  In addition, in June 2003, Paul Bremer issued an 
order protecting contractors from any threat of civil or criminal suit in Iraqi courts, even for 
crimes such as murder, torture, and rape.  Joanne Mariner, Private Contractors Who Torture, 
(June 17, 2004), available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/17/mariner.contractors/.  As 
Ms. Mariner suggests, local prosecution remains theoretically possible since “torture is 
presumably not foreseen in the contract” between the firms and the government, so that the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib “could be deemed to have been committed outside of the contractors’ 
official activities.”  Id.  But in dismissing this possibility, she notes that the June 2003 Bremer 
order also provided that “crimes committed during the contractors’ free time can only be 
prosecuted by local officials” if Bremer himself gives his written consent, which he is very 
unlikely to do.  Id. 
 25 The seven suspects are staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II, Specialist Charles A. Graner, 
Sergeant Javal Davis, Specialist Megan Ambuhl, Specialist Sabrina Harman, Private Jeremy 
Sivits, and Private Lynndie England.  Sergeant Frederick, the most senior military official 
charged, has said that “the military-intelligence teams, which included C.I.A. officers and 
linguists and interrogation specialists from private defense contractors, were the dominant force 
inside Abu Ghraib.” Seymour M. Hersch, The Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 
10, 2004, at 42. 
 26 Josh White, Abuse Report Widens Scope of Culpability, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at 
A1. 
 27 This statute essentially tracks the Geneva Convention’s definitions of war crimes. 
 28 According to Joanne Mariner, “MEJA, which was enacted primarily to protect American 
soldiers and their dependents living abroad, covers federal crimes punishable by more than one 
GILLES.FINAL 10/9/2005  12:43 PM 
8 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:1 
Other more mundane penalties exist for private contractors.  For 
example, private contracting firms whose employees have misbehaved 
or violated laws or treaties can be fired and barred from future bidding 
on government contracts.29  Still, politics and partisanship may have 
greater impact here than law.30  Alternatively, individual private 
contractors suspected of abuse can be fired.  Indeed, Steven 
Stephanowic and John Israel, both employees of a private firm 
contracted to provide support to U.S. troops in Iraq, were fired and 
reprimanded for their role in the interrogations and resultant abuses.31 
But, as one commentator asks, “Will the atrocities they committed be, at 
most, bad for their careers—a source of negative letters in their 
employment files?”32 
As we are constantly told by our elected officials, the world is a 
different place than it was before September 11th, and our responses to 
the changed circumstances carry greater consequences than ever before.  
It is imperative, as the articles in this symposium strongly suggest, for 
the legal system to address the questions of private entity liability for 
civil rights violations in this country.  Then, perhaps, we can address the 
broader questions that arise as we enter other arenas where the stakes 
may be far higher. 
 
year’s imprisonment. Passed in 2000, the law is still untested.” Mariner, supra note 24. 
 29 As Philip Carter notes: “Misbehaving firms can have their government contracts 
terminated; they can be barred from competing for future contracts; and they may also be subject 
to civil and criminal liability. However, nearly all of these penalties are at the discretion of the 
agency that issued the original contract. Procurement officials, political leaders, prosecutors, and 
judges get to decide whether to sanction contractors for allegedly breaking the law in Iraq.”  
Philip Carter, How to Discipline Private Contractors, (May 4, 2004), available at 
http://slate.msn.com/id/2099954. 
 30 Id. 
 31 According to General Taguba’s report, these private contractors “were either directly or 
indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu Ghraib.”  Hersch, supra note 25. 
 32 Mariner, supra note 24. 
